The study of regulation and regulatory governance is one of the most promising arenas for public policy research. Regulation is typically conceived as a two-party relationship between a rule-maker or regulator (R) and a rule-taker or target (T). This paper sets out an agenda for the study of regulation (and policy more broadly) as a three- (or more) party relationship – with regulatory intermediaries (I) at the center of the analysis. Intermediaries play major and varied roles in regulation, from providing expertise and feedback to facilitating implementation, monitoring the behavior of regulatory targets and building communities of assurance and trust. The author focus the analysis on two cases of intermediations:
a) banks, lawyers and accountants in the money laundering regime and,
b) wholesalers, distributors and physicians in the opioids epidemics. His aim is to discuss the politics beyond the design, interest aggregation and enforcement of the duty to report and to avoid harm in the two cases.
He suggests that the framework of responsibilization process can be useful in understanding the process of making intermediators as rule-takers and that this process as relevance to the way we think on public policy and the power of the state in public policy processes.
10 March 2020
Sciences Po, Room Goguel, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris
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